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4.1  Introduction 
The relationship between the exchange rate and economic development is 
certainly an important subject, from both a positive (descriptive)  and a norma- 
tive (policy prescription) perspective. Several developing countries that have 
implicitly or explicitly fixed their exchange rates to the currency of  another 
country (say, the U.S. dollar) and whose inflation rates are higher than that of 
the foreign country (the United States) often experience persistent current ac- 
count deficits and eventual devaluations of their currencies. Devaluation often 
invites a recession and inflation and thus pushes the economy into an inflation- 
devaluation spiral, causing a serious setback in economic development. Other 
developing countries grow exceptionally fast and often face the opposite pres- 
sure on their currencies.  A high economic growth rate is most likely accompa- 
nied by  a high investment rate, and high export growth as well. Successful 
exports produce current account surpluses, resulting in nominal appreciation 
pressure on the currency unless the central bank intervenes in the foreign ex- 
change market and  accumulates foreign reserves. Even if  the intervention 
maintains the fixed exchange rate, unsterilized intervention results in inflation, 
and the real exchange rate appreciates anyway. In the world of  free capital 
mobility, another channel for appreciation exists. Fast growth often invites in- 
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flows of  foreign capital. Some investors in industrial countries pursue high 
returns (even with high risk) as part of a diversified portfolio. Capital inflows 
put pressure on the (nominal) exchange rate to appreciate. For example, de- 
mand for the currency of an emerging market will rise when foreign investors 
plan to purchase bonds and stocks, because the local currency has to be ob- 
tained first. Put simply, successful economic development results in a currency 
appreciation with improvement in the standard of living, while failure in eco- 
nomic development often results in a sharp currency depreciation. 
One of the most popular hypotheses with respect to long-term real exchange 
rate movements is the so-called Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which conjec- 
tures that productivity increases in the tradable sector tend to be higher than 
those in the nontradable sector, so that the conventionally constructed real ex- 
change rate (using a price index that includes both tradable and nontradable 
prices, such as the CPI or GDP deflator) will move in a manner that reflects 
cross-country differences in the relative speed of  productivity increases be- 
tween the tradable and nontradable sectors.' Since the differences in productiv- 
ity increases are expected to be larger in high-growth countries, the Balassa- 
Samuelson prediction should be most visible among rapidly growing coun- 
tries. It is well known in the literature that the postwar Japanese record has 
been a prime example of  the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. However, one 
country does not prove the case. Hence, the Asian emerging markets with high 
growth rates seem to offer a good testing ground. A few additional thoughts 
and regressions are also shown and interpreted. 
Although the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis makes a prediction about the 
movement of the real exchange rate based on the common pattern (tradable 
sector productivity growth is higher than  nontradable) among high-growth 
countries, the original mechanism for high growth is not explained. The pres- 
ent paper examines why some countries grow faster and whether the mecha- 
nism for high growth makes a difference in proving or refuting the Balassa- 
Samuelson hypothesis. 
Japan and other high-growth countries in East Asia have completed, or have 
been experiencing, a transformation from agricultural, stagnant economies to 
manufacturing, export-oriented, growing economies. Their success is based on 
a change in industrial structure, gradually moving up a technological ladder. 
In  many countries, economic development changed the structure from low- 
value-added goods sectors, such as primary goods and textiles, to high-value- 
added goods sectors, such as manufacturing and machinery. Moreover, each 
sector  changes  its  trade  status  from  net  importer,  to  domestically  self- 
sufficient, to net exporter. The important element of economic development in 
Asia seems to be a constant upgrading (higher quality and more sophisticated 
1. The original articles are Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). For recent studies, see Asea 
and Mendoza (1994), De Gregorio and Wolf (1994). De Gregorio, Giovannini, and Wolf (1994), 
Marston (1990). See also Corden (1960). This paper draws heavily on Ito et al. (1996) but has a 
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products) of the industrial structure and exporting goods. This observation is 
sometimes nicknamed the “flying geese pattern” of economic development.2 
Its original meaning was that a particular manufacturing sector, such as the 
steel industry in Japan, experiences stages from an import surge, to a domestic 
production surge replacing imports, to an export surge; then the same pattern 
is repeated in the next industry up the sophistication ladder, say the automobile 
industry. The more recent, popularized version of the flying geese pattern is 
that the different Asian countries experience the same pattern of industrial de- 
velopment but with time lags. At a particular point in time, Japan is a leader 
followed by Singapore and Hong Kong, which are followed by Korea and Tai- 
wan, and then by Thailand and Indonesia, and so forth. We will make observa- 
tions about the relationship between the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and 
the flying geese hypothesis below. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 4.2, the relationship 
between changes in real exchange rates and growth rates among East Asian 
countries is reviewed. Section 4.3 examines the relationship between machin- 
ery exports and growth. Section 4.4 examines a relationship between export 
characteristics and growth, and another between export characteristics and real 
exchange rate changes. Section 4.5 examines the link between the Balassa- 
Samuelson hypothesis and stages of economic development. The link between 
productivity growth and relative price changes, one of the important links in 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, is examined in section 4.6 using sectoral 
data for Japan and the United States during 1960-92. 
4.2  Stylized Facts about the Balassa-Samuelson in APEC 
For testing the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, the relationship between the 
growth rate and changes in the real exchange rate is examined. The Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (APEC) countries and economies are 
taken  as examples here. Since economic development stages differ widely 
among APEC countries, the examination will be a good test of how universally 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis may apply. 
The growth rate and real exchange rate change are defined as follows. The 
growth rate, denoted by dG(j, t + k), is the average per capita GDP growth 
rate of country j between t and t + k 
Y(j,  t + k) = [I + dG(j,  t  + k)lkY(j,  t), 
where Y(j,t)  is per capita GDP of country j in year t. The growth rate relative 
to the United States is the difference between dG(j)  and dG(US). Let us denote 
by  S(j,t) the nominal exchange rate of  country j  in year t, in the unit of  the 
value of country  j’s currency in terms of the U.S. dollar, for example, dollars 
2. See Ito (1995) for this hypothesis. For traditional economic development theory, see, e.g., 
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Fig. 4.1  Growth versus real exchange rate changes: relative to the United 
States, 1973-95 
Source: See appendix. 
Note:  Sample period for Chile is 1975-95. 
per yen for Japan; P(j,t)  is the GDP deflator of country t, and P(US,t) is the 
GDP deflator of the United States. 
The (average compound) change in the real exchange rate Q of country j, 
dQ(j,t + k),  for k years, is defined in the equation 
Q(j,  t  + k) = 11  + dQ(j,  t  + k)l‘Q(j.  0, 
where Q(j,t) = s(j,t)p(j,t)/p(US,t). If dQ(-)  is positive, the currency of coun- 
tryj  is appreciating in the real exchange rate. 
Figure 4.1 shows the relationship between the economic growth rate and 
changes in  the real  exchange rate for the APEC countries for the period 
1973-95  (except for Chile, where the sample period is 1975-95).3 The positive 
relationship between economic growth and real appreciation that is a hallmark 
of  the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is found in Japan; among the four “ti- 
gers,’’ or newly industrialized economies (NIEs); and, to a much lesser extent, 
in Chile. One can also point out that the positive correlation was found in two 
other countries, Mexico and Papua New Guinea (PNG), in terms of negative 
growth (again relative to the United States) and depreciation (negative appreci- 
ation). However, not all APEC countries experienced positive correlation be- 
tween growth and real appreciation.  Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the 
Philippines experienced growth  rates  similar to  that  of  the  United  States 
3. For data sources, see It0 et al. (1996). For this paper, the data are updated to 1995. In our 
earlier work, the magnitude of real appreciation in Hong Kong and Singapore was smaller. Some 
possible reasons for the result were discussed. The real appreciation in the updating years made 
them comparable to Taiwan. Although Young (1992) emphasizes the difference in the investment 
and growth pattern between the two city-states, they look very similar in real exchange rate perfor- 
mance in the framework of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 113  Economic Growth and Real Exchange Rate 
Table 4.1  Balassa-Samuelson  Effect 
Coefficients 
- 
Sample  U  b  R2 
Total sample  -0.167  0.181  .o 1 
(-0.322)  (1.070) 
All but China  -0.236  0.357  .29 
(0.357)  (2.664) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are &statistics. 
Equation: dQ(j,  t + k) = a + b dG(j,  t + k). 
(within 1 percentage point) with little depreciation or appreciation. Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Malaysia experienced high growth with real depreciation, al- 
though the magnitude of depreciation was small. 
China, another high-growth country, experienced a large depreciation, thus 
appearing to violate the Balassa-Samuelson prediction. China’s  depreciation 
can be understood as an “outlier,” in that the country rapidly transformed from 
a closed, planned economy to an open economy in the last half of the sample 
period. The opening also meant correction of the overvalued exchange rate. In 
a sense, depreciation was necessary in order to compete in global markets. In 
a sense, large depreciation preceded high growth rates, but both are included 
in the sample period. This kind of drastic economic reform is not considered 
in the Balassa-Samuelson theory. 
As shown in table 4.1,  a simple regression produces an insignificant coeffi- 
cient for the growth rate, while a regression excluding China yields a growth 
coefficient significant at the 2 percent level. A possible justification for exclud- 
ing China from the sample, as suggested above, is that China had maintained 
strict trade and exchange controls in the 1970s and the 1980s. Although the 
sample used in the regression is too small to justify a general statement, it can 
be said that the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is in most cases supported by 
the APEC findings. 
In summary, figure 4.1 and table 4.1 indicate that the high-growth economies 
in East Asia generally experienced high growth and real appreciation in the 
period  1973-95.  This finding is consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson hy- 
pothesis. Although it is difficult to generalize the finding to other APEC mem- 
bers, the gross violation of the hypothesis is limited to China, which made the 
unusual economic transformation from a planned economy to a market econ- 
omy during the period. 
4.3  Export-Led Growth 
In  the theoretical Balassa-Samuelson framework, growth is exogenously 
given to the economy. How the tradable and nontradable sectors differ in pro- 
ductivity growth is not explained in the model. However, the theory hypothe- 114  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
sizes and predicts how they collectively contribute to the overall growth and 
change of relative prices, given growth in different sectors. 
The Balassa-Samuelson theory also differs from the often-heard advice that 
in order to promote growth, depreciation must be induced. If that were a pre- 
dominant mechanism for promotion of high economic growth, we would have 
found a negative correlation between growth and real appreciation for many 
countries (not just for China). 
In order to shed some light on where growth comes from, our next task is to 
investigate the source of growth and its relationship to real exchange rate be- 
havior. Many works, for example World Bank (1993), emphasize the impor- 
tance of exports in achieving sustained growth. In addition, a hypothesis that 
is often emphasized in development economics is that a country’s industrial 
and export structures have to change in order to make fast growth possible for 
a sustained period. As  the economy grows, there is a limit to how much of a 
single kind of  product, say textiles, can be exported to the global market, even 
if the economy becomes better at producing the product. Sooner or later, the 
comparative advantage of the industry is eroded either by political resistance 
to rapidly increasing imports in  destination countries or by  wage hikes  at 
home. With improved skills and work ethics among workers, the next-level 
industry, say machinery, would be ready to take off. Change in the structure of 
exports is one of the important aspects of  economic development and a high 
rate of  economic growth. A proxy variable for development of  high-value- 
added manufactured goods is needed for quantitative examinations. Here, the 
ratio of machine exports (value) to total exports (value), denoted by M(j,  r), is 
chosen as an indicator of  structural change. Its change from  1973 to  1992, 
denoted by dM(  j,t + k),  is defined as 
dM(j,t + k) = M(j,t + k) -  M(j,t). 
The growth rate, as defined above, dG, is expected to be closely related to 
export structure change. Figure 4.2 shows the relationship between the per 
capita growth rate and changes in the machine export ratio from 1973 to 1992 
(the last year that data for export ratios were available).  A rise in the manufac- 
turing sector in output and exports is one condition for a spurt in growth. Fig- 
ure 4.2 shows a positive relationship between the increase in machine exports 
and the growth rate. Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Japan 
show a strong correlation between the machine export ratio and growth. For 
this group of countries, exports are often called an engine of growth. 
Hong Kong and Indonesia experienced only a mild increase in the machine 
export ratio. China achieved high economic growth without a visible change 
in machine exports. The Western Hemisphere countries also show a positive 
relationship between a moderate increase in the machine export ratio and mod- 
erate growth. Advanced countries such as the United States and Japan have 
already achieved high levels of machine export ratio, so it would not be pos- 
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Fig. 4.2  Changes in machine export ratio versus growth, 1973-92 
Source: See appendix. 
Table 4.2  Machine Exports’ Effect on Growth 
Coefficients 
~ 
Sample  a  b  RZ 
Total sample  2.234  8.43  1  ,098 
(2.59)  ( 1.657) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Sample period is 1973-92. 
Equation: dG(  j,  t + k) = a + b dM(  j,  t + k). 
The regression analysis reported in table 4.2 supports, although with weak 
statistical significance, the casual observation of the positive relationship noted 
in  figure 4.2. More machine exports have been important in achieving high 
economic growth in  many East Asian countries. This is consistent with the 
conventional wisdom (in the literature explaining  Asian growth) that for high- 
speed growth, the shift in export items is to high-value-added, manufactured 
goods. 
The coefficient implies that a 10 percentage point rise in the ratio of machine 
exports to total exports increases the growth rate by 0.8 percentage points over 
the “natural” growth rate of  2.23 percent. Although the regression is very 
simple, it accords with a popular belief in the importance of structural changes 
in boosting the growth rate “temporarily”  (for a decade or two) before it comes 
down. The machine export ratio is bounded by  unity, so exceptional growth 
cannot continue. 
Suppose that a trade structure change, either policy driven or market driven, 
is the exogenous engine that pushes the economy to grow fast. The increasing 
share of machines in exports can be interpreted as faster productivity growth 116  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
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in the tradable sector, one of the assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson mech- 
anism. In this interpretation, both per capita growth and real exchange appre- 
ciation are the results of  fundamental structural change. According to this 
interpretation, in explaining real exchange rate change, it would be more ap- 
propriate to regress it on the increase in the machine export ratio rather than 
on economic growth. 
Figure 4.3 shows the relationship between the machine export ratio and real 
exchange rate changes from 1973 to 1992, the relationship between a pair of 
variables from figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively. Among the Asian high-growth 
countries, Korea, Taiwan, and Japan show strong gains in machine export ratio 
and real exchange rate. Hong Kong is now in line with Korea and Taiwan in 
the sense that it has only moderate gains in machine export ratio and real ex- 
change rate. Singapore and Malaysia remain a puzzle to believers in the flying 
geese and Balassa-Samuelson hypotheses: despite large gains in machine ex- 
port ratio, their real exchange rates have not appreciated. Thailand and the Phil- 
ippines also advanced in machine export ratio without real appreciation. China 
and Chile again are outliers with large real exchange rate depreciation. 
Table 4.3 shows that when the real exchange rate change is regressed on the 
change in machine export ratio, the coefficient is positive and significant (at 
the 10 percent significance level). 
In summary, figures 4.2 and 4.3 show that trade structure changes influence 
both the growth rate and the real exchange rate. The evidence in these figures is 
consistent with the hypothesis that an economic transformation to high-value- 
added industries is a key to economic growth with real exchange rate apprecia- 
tion. Advances in productivities and competitiveness in the high-value-added 
tradable sectors (here proxied by the machine export ratio) are consistent with 
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Table 4.3  Machine Exports’ Effect on the Real Exchange Rate 
Coefficients 
~ 
Sample  U  b  R2 
Total sample  -  1.373  0.752  .I39 
(-1.827)  (1.892) 
~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Nore: Numbers in parentheses are r-statistics 
Equation: dQ(  j,  t + k) = a + b dM(  j,  t + k). 
both a positive correlation between growth rates and real appreciation and the 
basic premise of economic development with industrial transformation. 
4.4  Examination of the Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis 
In  this section, some of  the basic assumptions of  the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis are examined to confirm how it works for Japan and the NIEs and 
how it does not necessarily work for other countries (especially Association of 
South East Asian Nations c~untries).~ 
In the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, high economic growth is made pos- 
sible by  high productivity growth, with differential sectoral growth rates that 
cause inflation differentials among different sectors. The relative price of  non- 
tradable (N) goods to tradable (T) goods is expected to rise faster in countries 
with faster growth, since the differential in inflation rates must widen in order 
to make the overall growth rate higher. Combining this with the assumption 
that the prices of tradable goods are equalized across countries, the real cur- 
rency appreciation of countries with high growth is derived. In a schematic 
way, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis can be decomposed into four steps: 
Al. The differential in productivity growth rates between the tradable and 
nontradable sectors causes relative price changes. 
A2. The ratio of nontradable prices to tradable prices is higher in a faster 
growing economy. 
A3. The ratio of tradable prices across countries remains constant (or in the 
special case when tradable prices are equalized across countries). 
A4.  A combination of A2 and A3 causes real exchange rate appreciation. 
In the rest of this section, we investigate whether the relationship between 
growth and relative prices holds and whether tradable price equality holds. In 
order to do this, the decomposition of real appreciation is helpful. Let us denote 
the broad price index of countryj by P(j).  The price index could be the GDP 
deflator or the CPI index. The price index is composed of nontradable prices, 
P,,  and tradable prices, PT.  The weight of nontradable goods is n. 
4. This section is largely based on Isard (1995) and Ito, Isard, and Bayoumi (1996). 118  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
Similarly for world prices (denoted by an asterisk): 
(2)  P*  = n* P:  + (1 -  n*)PT. 
Here “world prices” means prices in the United States, the benchmark country. 
Let us denote the ratio of common currency prices of tradables by  b, which, 
according to A3, is supposed to stay constant: 





n and n* 
the ratio of common currency prices of  tradables, 
the relative nontradable price of country j, 
the relative nontradable price of the benchmark country, and 
the weights of the nontradable sector in the overall price in- 
dexes. 
As mentioned above, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis assumes that b stays 
constant, or the law of one price for tradables. Then for countries other than 
the benchmark country (the United States, for which  P,*/P,* is given), the 
higher the relative price of nontradable goods, PN(j)/PT(j),  the higher the real 
exchange rate becomes. 
The first issue in estimating the relative nontradable price is to identify the 
sectors that can be regarded as “nontradable” and “tradable.” Here, manufac- 
turing is assumed to be “tradable” and services “nontradable.” The prices are 
recovered as unit values from nominal and real series of  these  sector^.^ 
Figure 4.4  shows the relationship between relative per capita GDP growth 
(as in fig. 4.1)  and changes in the nontradable-tradable price ratio. Both vari- 
ables are measured relative to the benchmark values of the United States. The 
sample periods vary slightly for different countries, depending on the availabil- 
ity of relative price data. If  differential productivity growth rates between the 
nontradable and tradable sectors are the source of both high income growth 
5. For developing countries, the data set used in this analysis is the World Bank‘s Economic and 
Social Database, while for industrial countries, the data set is from the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). 119  Economic Growth and Real Exchange Rate 
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Fig. 4.4  Growth versus changes in nontradable prices, 1973-93 
Source: See appendix. 
Note: Data restrictions limit the sample periods of  the following countries as  noted: Australia, 
1974-93;  Canada, 1973-92; Chile, 1975-88;  Korea, 1973-92;  Malaysia, 1974-93;  New Zealand, 
1977-92; Papua New Guinea, 1980-93;  Hong Kong, 1975-93. 
and inflation differentials between the two sectors, there should exist a positive 
correlation between change in the nontradable-tradable price ratio and income 
growth. However, figure 4.4 does not show such a correlation. Although some 
difficulties exist in passing from theory to data, such as making a precise dif- 
ferentiation between tradable and nontradable sectors in the data, the evidence 
in this figure does not support the logic of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
Figure 4.4 also shows that several fast-growing Asian countries, namely, 
Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore, have not experienced rises in 
the relative price of nontradables (relative to the United States), while other 
countries-Korea,  China, Taiwan, Indonesia, and Japan-show  positive cor- 
relations between growth and change in the nontradable-tradable price ratio 
(both relative to the United States). Other, slow-growth countries do not show 
any patterns on this relationship. As long as the United States is taken as a 
benchmark, a causality link from growth to relative nontradable prices is not 
confirmed. 
Figure 4.5 shows the relationship between changes in the ratio of common 
currency tradable prices and the real exchange rate. The vertical axis is the 
same as in figure 4.1, change in the real exchange rate (vis-A-vis the United 
States, using the GDP deflator). The horizontal axis is change in tradable prices 
(vis-A-vis  those of  the United States). This is an investigation into whether 
assumption A3 holds. Assumption A3 states that the ratio of  tradable prices 
across countries remains the same (in other words, “relative” purchasing power 
parity [PPP] in tradables holds), implying that b(j)  should be constant for all 
time periods, so that all countries should cluster around the vertical line at 
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Fig. 4.5  Changes in common currency tradable prices versus real exchange 
rate changes, 1973-92 
Source: See appendix. 
change in tradable prices vis-8-vis U.S. tradable prices, or a deviation from the 
vertical axis when the tradable price change equals zero. 
In many countries (see the southeast quadrant of the figure), the movement 
of tradable prices (increase) is opposite to real exchange rate changes, in con- 
trast to the partial correlation suggested by  equation (3). In other countries 
(Korea, Japan, Mexico, Singapore, Australia, and Indonesia), the overall corre- 
lation has the same sign as the partial correlation. Both Korea and Japan expe- 
rienced high real exchange rate appreciation. However, Korea seems to be con- 
sistent with the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis (it lies near the vertical axis; 
i.e., relative PPP in tradables holds), while Japan seems to have experienced a 
deviation from it. Again, the evidence in figure 4.5 does not generally support 
one of the basic assumptions of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
In order to quantify the contribution of  the different components of  real 
exchange rate changes as depicted in  equation (3), a decomposition of  the 
changes is shown in table 4.4. The proximate determinants of the real exchange 
rate are calculated. The table quantifies what we have learned from the series 
of figures. In table 4.4, the real exchange rate is calculated based on the GDP 
deflator, but as if the GDP consisted only of the output of the manufacturing 
and service sectors. The table shows that proximate causes of real exchange 
rate change are quite different from country to country. Among high-growth 
Asian countries, only Japan, Korea, and Singapore had real exchange rate 
appreciation (with Hong Kong and Taiwan  omitted due to unavailability of 
data). In Singapore relative nontradable prices changed in the wrong direction 
(from the Balassa-Samuelson point of view). Some typology emerges from the 
above observations. Section 4.5 summarizes the applicability of  the Balassa- 
Samuelson effect on each country in the Asian region and, if  the effect is not 121  Economic Growth and Real Exchange Rate 
Table 4.4  Changes in Real Exchange Rates and Proximate Determinants, 
1973-92 
Country  Q  b  n  PNlPT 
Australia  -20.9  -18.7  2.9  -4.8 
Canada  -0.6  16.2  7.0  -20.4 
Chile  -32.7  -  13.8  0.1  -29.0 
China  -74.5  -77.7  -27.6  46.0 
Indonesia  -35.9  -35.3  -23.8  -4.3 
Japan  36.8  27.8  -7.7  17.0 
Korea  62.9  3.8  -27.0  86.0 
Malaysia  -  16.4  1.1  -6.4  -23.6 
Mexico  11.0  15.5  -7.7  -6.3 
New Zealand  23.3  21.6  -1.8  1.5 
Papua New Guinea  -22.7  6.6  -0.7  -34.3 
Philippines  15.8  36.0  6.2  -20.6 
Singapore  8.6  59.4  -1.5  -41.8 
Thailand  -1.8  11.3  -  17.9  -  15.2 
Source: It0 et al. (1996). 
Notes: Determinants n and PN/PT  are measured as ratios to U.S. levels. Sample periods are differ- 
ent for the following countries: Canada, 1971-90;  Chile, 1975-88;  New Zealand, 1977-90;  Papua 
New Guinea, 1980-92;  and Malaysia, 1973-83. 
applicable, reasons for the deviation. (All the comparative statements are vis- 
8-vis the United States.) 
In summary, we have two ways to interpret the rather disappointing findings 
in figures 4.4 and 4.5 and to reconcile them with the more positive findings in 
figure 4.1. One interpretation is that because the assumptions that make up the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis are not verified, the validity of the hypothesis 
itself is in question. The other interpretation is that the Balassa-Samuelson hy- 
pothesis is basically confirmed, as shown in figure 4.1, but examination of each 
component of the hypothesis is not practicable because, for example, differen- 
tiation between the tradable and nontradable sectors is hardly possible in the 
available data. 
4.5  Balassa-Samuelson Effects with Stages of Economic Development 
Japan is known in the literature to be a country that  conforms with the 
Balassa-Samuelson prediction, namely, the positive correlation between eco- 
nomic growth and real exchange rate appreciation. Figure 4.1 showed that Ko- 
rea and Taiwan, and to a lesser extent Hong Kong and Singapore, also experi- 
enced strong real appreciation with growth. However, examining closely how 
assumptions for the Balassa-Samuelson prediction hold up in the data, careful 
statements are needed. In the Korean case, tradable prices did not rise but non- 
tradable prices rose sharply, consistent with the Balassa-Samuelson assump- 
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the United  States, with nontradable prices rising much  more than tradable 
prices. Machine exports rose for Korea, suggesting that high-value-added ex- 
ports have been the engine of rapid growth. In Singapore, although tradable 
prices rose only slightly, nontradable prices rose less than tradable prices. Both 
Hong Kong and Singapore thrive on entrepbt trade and financial services (non- 
tradables). At this point, our data are so coarsely aggregated that it is difficult 
to make a judgment, but it is possible that the service sector experienced pro- 
ductivity increases as fast as tradables did, so that relative prices between the 
two sectors did not follow the traditional logic of the Balassa-Samuelson hy- 
pothesis. There is a group of countries that contradicts the Balassa-Samuelson 
hypothesis; namely, the real exchange rate depreciated rather than appreciated 
while economic growth took place. The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis does 
not explain the real exchange rate behavior of Thailand and Malaysia, either. 
The real exchange rates of these countries were relatively stable. Nontradable 
prices (relative to tradable prices) did not change much, or even slightly de- 
clined, in contradiction to assumption A2. The fact that Thailand, Malaysia, 
and Indonesia managed to keep their real exchange rates more or less constant 
as their economies grew rapidly is not well explained. All three countries have 
traditionally had strong primary goods exports: Thailand, food; Malaysia, pri- 
mary goods such as palm oil and rubber; Indonesia, oil. Industrialization has 
changed their export structures quickly, especially in Thailand and Malaysia. 
In both Thailand and Malaysia, the machine export ratio rose at a moderate 
pace. Although these countries are also prime examples of how growth can be 
achieved by transforming the export structure to more high-value-added prod- 
ucts, it is somewhat puzzling why nontradable prices are not rising in these 
countries. 
The Philippines provides an even stronger contradiction of  assumption A2 
in which the tradable prices rose relative to nontradable goods. The Philippines 
was one country that did not share in the high growth of the region. The growth 
rate remained low. The nominal exchange rate depreciated as general inflation 
was higher than in the United States, and the real exchange rate was kept more 
or less constant. However, with tradables prices rising relative to nontradables 
prices, the price advantage in exports has been lost. 
China experienced the largest real depreciation in our samples, while eco- 
nomic growth was respectably high. The primary reason for the real deprecia- 
tion was the large nominal exchange rate depreciation after 1979. We  should 
note that both trade and capital account restrictions were rather tight in China 
during most of the sample period. At the initial point of  our sample (1973) 
China’s  exchange rate  was  probably overvalued, but  large current account 
deficits did not occur only because of high tariffs and trade restrictions. The 
change in policy in the late 1980s allowed a decrease in dollar-value tradable 
prices and a depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, both of  which pro- 
moted exports and growth. The foreign exchange restrictions on current ac- 
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sample, while other  developing countries in  our  sample lifted  restrictions 
sometime in the 1980~~ 
It is quite likely that a country that moves from a closed economy policy to 
an open, growth-oriented policy must depreciate its currency before opening 
the economy. In this case, the real depreciation is not the result of economic 
growth but a precondition for trade-oriented growth. The findings above sup- 
port the view that China (in 1973-92)  is a successful case. According to this 
view, China depreciated its currency (toward equilibrium) to promote exports, 
which resulted in growth. Since the machine export ratio did not rise (fig. 4.2), 
the export increase came mostly from price competitiveness, and not from a 
trade compositional shift to high-value-added products. Indonesia may be sim- 
ilar to China, in that the nominal exchange rate depreciated as the economy 
grew. Both dollar-value tradable and nontradable prices had declined (thus pro- 
moting exports and growth). Since Indonesia’s machine export ratio did not 
rise (fig. 4.2), the export increase came mostly from price competitiveness, and 
not from a trade compositional shift to high-value-added products. 
The  above examinations suggest that  there are  at least  three ways  that 
Balassa-Samuelson’s basic assumptions can be violated. First, relative tradable 
prices across countries may  not  stay constant. When  industrial and  export 
structures are changing fast, not only relative prices but also the composition 
among tradables are changing. Tradable prices may  appear to rise when the 
composition of  domestic products and exports changes to high-value-added 
goods. Assumption A2 still holds if  nontradable prices increase much faster 
than tradable prices. Second, the ratio of nontradable prices to tradable prices 
may not behave as Balassa and Samuelson postulated. In some economies, non- 
tradable sectors, especially financial services, increased productivity. Third, 
trade restrictions and foreign exchange rate restrictions may prevent both eco- 
nomic growth and the adjustment of  prices and exchange rates to reflect the 
competitiveness of industries. Economic reform often produces large deprecia- 
tion to kick start growth. High growth follows large depreciation, apparently 
violating the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. 
The following summary based on development stages is consistent with the 
apparently conflicting pieces of evidence presented above. When the economy 
first opens up (to market mechanisms and to trade), it often needs real depreci- 
ation in order to eliminate import barriers and promote exports. If reforms are 
successful, the data would show that the economy experiences both growth 
and real depreciation. In the initial stage of industrialization, both nontradable 
and tradable prices may stay relatively stable, since the labor shift from surplus 
sectors (often agriculture) to booming sectors cancels out any inflation pres- 
sure. However, as the economy moves into a stage of producing sophisticated 
goods with a limited supply of labor, relative price movements reflect produc- 
6. China liberalized foreign exchange controls on the current account transactions and accepted 
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Fig. 4.6  Japan: sectoral productivity growth and inflation, 1961-92 
Source: OECD (various issues). 
Note:  Const = construction; agri = agriculture; transp = transportation; manuf = manufacturing. 
tivity differentials among different sectors. Increasing sophistication of the 
economy, for example proxied by the machine export ratio, can be correlated 
with growth and real appreciation. As there are diverse economies in the APEC 
group, the picture we obtain from APEC (e.g., fig. 4.1) is a mix of  different 
combinations of growth and real exchange rate changes. 
4.6  Productivity Increases and Relative Price Changes 
The key observation of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is that productivi- 
ties grow at different rates among different sectors and countries. As techno- 
logical progress tends to occur in manufacturing sectors and other tradable 
goods sectors, a country can achieve higher overall economic growth by in- 
creasing the difference between the productivities of tradable sectors and those 
of  nontradable sectors. The productivity differentials result in relative price 
changes. The link between productivities and relative price changes was not 
tested in this paper because it is often difficult to obtain reliable data on sec- 
toral productivities in developing countries. In this section, as an example, sec- 
toral (labor) productivities and sectoral (GDP) deflators are examined for Ja- 
pan and the United States using OECD sectoral output data for 1961-92. 
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 show the correlation between changes in labor produc- 
tivities and relative price changes of different sectors in Japan and the United 
States, respectively.' The figures clearly show the negative correlation between 
7. The data come from OECD (various issues). The tables that correspond to these figures are 
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Fig. 4.7  United States: sectoral productivity growth and inflation, 1961-92 
Source: OECD (various issues). 
Note: Const = construction; agri = agriculture; transp = transportation; manuf = manufacturing. 
productivity increase and price inflation among different sectors in both coun- 
tries. In each country, the manufacturing sector has achieved the highest (or 
a close second in the United States) productivity increase and the lowest in- 
flation. The agriculture industry, as well as the energy and transport industries, 
is better than average in both countries. Typical nontradable industries, such 
as construction, achieved only low productivity increases (or negative in the 
United States) and very high inflation. Hence, the link between productivity 
increase and sectoral inflation is clearly shown. 
Comparing Japan and the United States, tradable sectors in Japan had much 
faster productivity growth, thus raising the overall growth rate, than the United 
States. Low inflation in the manufacturing sector also contributed to low price 
increases among tradables in Japan relative to the United States. Figures 4.6 
and 4.7  clearly show that assumption Al-the  larger the productivity differ- 
ence between the tradable and nontradable sectors, the larger the inflation dif- 
ferential-was  a reasonable one at least in Japan and the United States, and 
also in the comparison between the two countries. The differential in inflation 
rates among the tradable and nontradable sectors explains the real exchange 
rate appreciation of the yen vis-8-vis the U.S. dollar. 
4.7  Concluding Remarks 
The typology and evidence in the previous sections showed some evidence 
of the applicability of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis to high-growth coun- 
tries in Asia, although violations were also evident. The Balassa-Samuelson 126  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
effect is found to be most prominent in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, resourceless 
economies that transformed from agricultural states, to light industrial goods 
(e.g., textile) exporters, to heavy industrial goods exporters. As trade was pro- 
moted, nontradable goods became relatively expensive. Subsequent analysis 
showed that there are at least three ways to violate the logic of the hypothesis: 
nontradable prices relative to tradable prices may  not rise as the economy 
grows; tradable prices, measured in U.S. dollars, may  deviate from tradable 
prices in the United States; and economic reforms may cause negative correla- 
tion between growth and real appreciation. 
The paper suggests that applicability of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis 
to a particular economy depends on the development stage of the economy. It 
is especially applicable when a resourceless open economy is growing fast by 
changing industrial structure and export composition. Even if the economy is 
growing fast, Balassa-Samuelson may  not be applicable if  the economy has 
just come out of the primary goods exporter or planned economy phase. It is 
possible, however, that for these countries, further development of the econ- 
omy will result in real appreciation in the future. 
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Oceania 
AUS  Australia 
NZL  New Zealand 
PNG  Papua New Guinea 
Data Description 
GDP per capita growth rate. Real GDP is divided by  population. Average 
change (growth rate) is defined as a compound rate for a specified period. 
Source: IMF, International Financial Statistics (ZFS; Washington, D.C., vari- 
ous issues). 
Nominal exchange rate and real exchange rate. Nominal exchange rate is de- 
fined as the local currency value in terms of the U.S. dollar. Real exchange rate 
is defined as the bilateral exchange rate vis-8-vis the United States, adjusted to 
the difference between the GDP deflators of the country and the United States. 
Average change for a period is defined as a compound rate for the period. 
Source: IFS. 
Machine export ratio. Machine exports (value) divided by total exports (value). 
Source: World Bank, World*Data database. 
Nontradable-tradable price ratio and tradable prices. Tradable price (P,) in- 
dex is the GDP deflator for the manufacturing sector, and nontradable price 
(P,) index is the weighted average of GDP deflators for other sectors. Relative 
PN/PT  ratio for country j vis-8-vis the United States was calculated as 
‘(j) =  [pN(j>/p,(j)l/[pN(us>/pT(us)I. 
Source: For industrial countries, OECD (various issues, detailed tables). For 
developing countries, World Bank, NA data bank. 
Exceptions are as follows: (i) Data for Hong Kong are not reported in the 
above sources. The P,/P,  ratio for Hong Kong is constructed by Baekin Cha 
from the Hong Kong disaggregated consumer index, CPI (A) series. Nontrada- 
ble categories are housing, transport, and miscellaneous services. Tradable cat- 
egories are all others, including clothing and footwear, durable goods, food, 
fuel and light, miscellaneous goods, alcoholic drinks, and tobacco. The index 
is constructed for 1975-95.  (ii) Data for Taiwan are not reported in the above 
sources. The P,/P, ratio for Taiwan is constructed by Kenneth Lin from Taiwan 
National Income Accounts. Tradable prices are a weighted average of  GDP 
deflators for agriculture and fishing, quarrying, and manufacturing. Nontrad- 
able prices are a weighted average of GDP deflators for utilities, construction, 
commerce, transport and communications, financial and business services, and 
other services. 128  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
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Comment  Kenichi Ohno 
This paper by  Ito, Isard, and Symansky provides us with good material for 
thinking seriously about  the Balassa-Samuelson effect in  the fast-growing 
Asian economies. Using comparable data from a fairly large number of coun- 
Kenichi Ohno is professor of economics at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, 
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tries, the authors discover that the experiences of Japan, Taiwan, and Korea- 
the first geese in the Asian dynamic growth chain-are  generally consistent 
with the implications of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. This alone is an 
important finding. However, the authors place greater emphasis on the fact that 
when the scope of  the study is enlarged to include all APEC countries, one 
does not find apparent conformity to the hypothesis. The authors then suggest 
possible reasons for this failure. 
As thought-provoking, introductory research, this paper raises more ques- 
tions than it answers. Economists who wish to pursue this line of  research 
must tackle the puzzles that Ito et al. uncover, collect necessary data and use 
appropriate statistical techniques, and identify the reasons why the Balassa- 
Samuelson hypothesis fails in many of these countries. This is not done ade- 
quately in the present paper. The cross-country data set used here, with no 
particular concern for the different economic structures or exchange rate poli- 
cies of the different countries (see below), is a bit too crude for these purposes. 
As  the authors correctly recognize, the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is 
based on two separate propositions that are each statistically verifiable. The 
first proposition is that productivity growth in the tradable sector is faster than 
in the nontradable sector-a  structural and sectoral phenomenon. The second 
is PPP in  tradable goods-a  macroeconomic, exchange rate  phenomenon. 
When these conditions hold simultaneously, the home currency is observed to 
appreciate over time in real terms when a broad basket including both tradable 
and nontradable commodities is used to calculate the real exchange rate. These 
two underlying propositions are good starting points for asking why real ap- 
preciation-defined  in this way-does  not seem to occur in many Asia Pa- 
cific countries. 
As to the first proposition (sectoral productivity gap), there are a few empiri- 
cal issues to be checked. First, we must identify the pattern of  productivity 
growth across different sectors of  each economy using perhaps two-digit or 
three-digit industrial data. Measurement of productivity is not a trivial exer- 
cise, especially for those countries with less than reliable data, and this un- 
avoidably leads to a margin of error. Second, again for each economy, we must 
distinguish “tradable” industries with significant international price arbitrage 
from “nontradable” industries without such arbitrage. The paper adopts a sim- 
plifying assumption that manufactured products are tradable and services are 
nontradable in all countries, but this may  not be true-especially  for Hong 
Kong and Singapore, where many services (finance, leasing, entertainment, 
insurance, computer software, and even construction) are highly tradable. In 
Japan, wholesale prices have been more representative of tradable goods than 
consumer prices, but this presumption may not hold in other countries. There 
is no common list of tradable goods for all countries. After these questions are 
adequately answered, we can finally ask: are high-productivity-growth indus- 
tries concentrated in the tradable sector? 
The second proposition (PPP in tradables) is even more tenuous-as  is well 130  Takatoshi Ito, Peter Isard, and Steven Symansky 
known from the existing literature on PPP. In fact, even PPP in actually traded 
goods generally does not hold. The violation occurs for two distinct reasons. 
First, the exchange rate as an asset price is sensitive to news and prone to 
short-term volatility and medium-term misalignment. Given this instability, the 
observed degree of “overvaluation” depends critically on the particular sample 
period chosen. Even though there may be a long-term trend toward overvalu- 
ation reflecting sectoral real change, short-term noise may simply be too great. 
Second, deviation from PPP may be the result of  a deliberate policy-either 
of the home country or of  a foreign country. The government may  wish to 
keep the currency depreciated in order to bolster exports. Conversely, surplus 
countries are often pressured into appreciating their currencies. Thus market 
forces as well as intentional policies  seriously undermine PPP in tradable 
goods, which is one of the two key ingredients of the Balassa-Samuelson hy- 
pothesis. 
Then there is the intractable problem of systemic change. China is an outlier 
in the present paper partly because it had a large nominal devaluation in 1994. 
But the devaluation was accompanied by the unification of two exchange rates 
and other reforms. The question is: how  can we correctly measure the real 
exchange rate when the foreign exchange market-and  the economy as a 
whole-is  making a transition from plan to market? Simply deflating the offi- 
cial exchange rate by the official price index may seriously bias the result. 
The Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis is easy to demonstrate in a simple two- 
sector model, but its empirical application may not be so straightforward be- 
cause of  all the complications mentioned above. Researchers must control for 
different economic and trade structures, policy bias, temporary exchange rate 
overvaluation, systemic change, and so forth. After all these “other factors” 
have  been  controlled, my  conjecture-but  only  a  conjecture-is  that  the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect might be  more applicable to the dynamic Asian 
economies than the present paper finds. 
COllUllent  Anne 0.  Krueger 
This is a valuable paper. It has long been recognized that “real” exchange rates 
tend to appreciate as living standards rise. That is, if  one estimates PPP ex- 
change rates, one finds that countries with low per capita incomes tend to have 
exchange rates that permit a unit of foreign currency to command more pur- 
chasing power than countries with higher per capita income. 
Anne 0. Krueger is the Herald L. and Caroline L. Ritch Professor of Economics, senior fellow 
of  the Hoover Institution, and director of the Center for Research on Economic Development 
and Policy Reform  at Stanford University, and a research associate of the National Bureau of 
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In examining the PPP relation, Balassa and Samuelson each pointed to the 
observed real appreciation with rising per capita incomes as an empirical phe- 
nomenon. Independently, a Swedish economist, Aukrust, developed a model 
that might explain the phenomenon. In Aukrust’s view, productivity tends to 
increase more rapidly in traded goods sectors than in nontraded goods sectors; 
as a result, real wages must rise in nontraded goods as well as traded goods. 
Since, he thought, nontraded goods were labor intensive, the higher real wage 
would raise their relative prices, thus giving the result. 
In testing the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, Ito, Isard, and Symansky sim- 
ply accept the hypothesis, without any underlying analytical framework, and 
yet seem puzzled by their results. In my comments, I want first to sketch out 
an analytical framework that can, at least broadly, predict Ito et al.’s findings. 
After that, I raise some questions about the value of the machinery indicator. 
Ito et al. report on tests of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis for East Asian 
countries. They do so by assuming that the real exchange rate reflects the rela- 
tive price of tradables in terms of home goods. 
This procedure spurs the starting point for my first comment: what is the 
real exchange rate under examination? If, for example, there is factor price 
equalization across traded goods, and home goods are produced with the same 
production functions and the same factors of production as traded goods, one 
would observe home goods price equalization. Even if Aukrust was right, as 
long as productivity in tradables grew at the same rate across countries and 
factor price equalization continued to hold, there would still be no Balassa- 
Samuelson effect: all countries would experience the same rate of increase in 
real wages. This result would continue to hold even if a time unit of labor had 
different efficiencies in different countries. 
If the price of nontraded goods does differ across countries, the question is: 
what generates that difference? One possible answer arises in the context of 
an Arthur Lewis-type  model, in which the real wage is set in the rural sector 
during the early stages of  development: growth of  other economic activities 
can take place at a constant real wage (or a real wage rising in line with in- 
creases in  the  marginal product  of  labor in  agriculture, presumably  very 
slowly) until labor can no longer be released from agriculture without an in- 
crease in its marginal product. At that point, the real wage would start rising 
throughout the economy. 
If one were to blend the Lewis model of labor supply to a trade model, the 
prediction would be that countries with higher labor productivity in agriculture 
would have higher real incomes and their exchange rates would conform to 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis. In the post-Lewis phase, growth of labor 
productivity would drive the appreciating real exchange rate. 
All of the above assumes no trade restrictions. It is well known that a highly 
protected economy will have, at equilibrium  (given whatever tariffs and quanti- 
tative restrictions are in place), a more appreciated real exchange rate than it 
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This simple framework can go a long way to explaining, or at least providing 
one explanation of, Ito et al.’s results. China liberalized and hence has had a 
real depreciation despite rapid growth. Korea, Japan, and Taiwan have passed 
the Lewis phase, so their real wages have been rising rapidly, and with it their 
real exchange rate relative to PPP. Countries in Southeast Asia, however, prob- 
ably have large enough populations in rural areas that the behavior of the real 
wage is driven at least partly by Lewis-type effects from the countryside, and 
one would not observe the Balassa-Samuelson effect to the same degree. There 
has also been some liberalization of the trade regime in Southeast Asia, which 
might also account for some part of the observed exchange rate behavior. 
Let me now turn to the use of  the machinery-to-total-export ratio. I think 
that it is highly dangerous, especially if policymakers view the link as a causal 
one. First of all, I am not sure why Ito et al. think that high-value-added activi- 
ties are important. Moreover, they do not specify what they mean by high value 
added: as a percentage of sales price? Per worker? Diamond cutting is a highly 
skilled job, yet value added as a percentage of  sales price is low. It is not the 
percentage value added of final product that matters, but rather the marginal 
product of  the domestic factors of production (especially labor). 
In  addition, it may well be that East Asia’s comparative advantage lies at 
least in part in abundance of factors (skilled labor?) that are employed inten- 
sively in the production of machines. That does not prove that more machines 
exported lead to more growth. It might instead simply reflect the underlying 
realities of economic efficiency: those Asian countries with realistic exchange 
rates also had rapid rates of growth of machinery exports. For other countries, 
the appropriate commodity composition of trade might be significantly differ- 
ent, and machinery might continue to be a major import item. 
Nonetheless, if there were better estimates of the appropriate real exchange 
rate, policymakers would be able to make their decisions with less uncertainty 
than is currently the case. Ito et al.’s paper makes an important contribution to 
increasing understanding of what is appropriate. 
Moreover, if one were to take Ito et al.’s results literally, one could increase 
world GDP without limit by having countries import machinery in order to re- 
export it. A machine could go from country to country adding value as it was 
reexported. Ito et al. assume that the percentage of  exports constituting ma- 
chinery and equipment is bounded above by 100, but that need not be the case. 